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Abstract 
 
Every three years the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) hold a Summit 
of Heads of States and Governments to take stock of the progress made in the 
implementation of the Africa-EU Partnership. The 5th African Union-EU Summit will take 
place on 29-30 November 2017 in Abidjan. On this occasion, this paper aims to analyse 
the interplay between the EU Delegation (EUDEL) and the permanent missions of the 
EU member states to the African Union in Addis Ababa. To what extent has the EUDEL 
emerged as a post-Westphalian diplomatic actor that centralizes, complements or 
competes with the diplomatic activities of member states’ permanent missions? I 
argue that the EUDEL and its member states have created an ‘umbrella regional 
diplomacy’, where member states embed their bilateral diplomatic relations in the 
overall European approach towards the AU. However, since it is up to the AU to grant 
access to its meetings, the interplay between the EUDEL and its member states’ 
permanent missions is importantly shaped by the AU’s preferences for its diplomatic 
counterpart(s).  
 
EU Diplomacy Paper 13/2017 
4 
Introduction: The EU Delegation in Addis Ababa as a diplomatic actor 
 
On 29-30 November 2017, the 5th Summit of Heads of States and Governments from 
the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) will take place in Abidjan, Ivory 
Coast. This is an important opportunity to deepen the reflection on the diplomatic 
relations that interlink both continents. Since the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy (JAES) in 2007,1 AU-EU relations have become increasingly comprehensive 
and relevant to all stakeholders, including the EU, its member states, the AU and its 
respective member states.2 The permanent diplomatic hub that connects both 
continents is the EU Delegation (EUDEL) to the African Union, based in Addis Ababa, 
the AU’s headquarter. The EU Delegation to the AU was established in 2008 to ensure 
a permanent presence as well as to implement and to operationalize the JAES.3 
Besides its political relevance, the analysis of the EUDEL to the AU touches upon a more 
profound question of European diplomacy4 – the role of EU Delegations as emerging 
diplomatic actors. Diplomatic actors are thereby defined as “internationally 
recognised representatives of internationally recognised entities”.5 
The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon states the key legal provisions that have boosted the 
importance of EU Delegations. Art. 47 TEU introduces the legal personality of the 
Union.6 This is crucial for the EU’s external representation in general as it gives a 
legitimate legal basis to the EU to be represented internationally. Before that, it was 
only the Community, but not the entire EU who benefited from a legal personality.7 
Regarding the role of the EUDELs, Art. 221(1) TFEU stipulates that “Union delegations in 
third countries and at international organisations shall represent the Union”.8 
Institutionally, this holistic representation of the Union is defined by Art. 221(2) TFEU 
                                                 
1 Council of the European Union, The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 
Lisbon, 9 December 2007. 
2 Delegation of the European Union to the African Union, About the EU Delegation to the 
African Union, Addis Ababa, 2017.  
3 Ibid.  
4 In my empirical analysis, I refer to European diplomacy as a notion that embraces both EU 
diplomacy and EU member states’ diplomacy.  
5 C. Bjola and M. Kornprobst, “Towards Inclusive Diplomacy“, in C. Bjola and M. Kornprobst, 
Understanding International Diplomacy: Theory, Practice and Ethics, London, Routledge, 2013, 
p. 201. 
6 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of March 2010”, Official Journal of the European Union, 
C83, 30 March 2010, Art. 47 TEU.  
7 K.V. Laatikainen, “The EU Delegation in New York: A Debut of High Political Drama”, in D. 
Spence and J. Bàtora (eds.), The European External Action Service European Diplomacy Post-
Westphalia, Houndmills,  Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 196.  
8 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of March 2010”, op.cit.  
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stating that the EUDELs fall under the authority of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR),9 who is assisted by the European External 
Action Service (EEAS).10 Only in the “areas where the Commission exercises the powers 
conferred upon it by the Treaties, the Commission may, in accordance with Article 
221(2) TFEU, also issue instructions to delegations”.11  
In light of the increased importance of the EUDELs, the question arises about the 
relationship between the EUDELs and the EU member states’ diplomatic missions.12 This 
question is important because it puts the traditional Westphalian system of state 
diplomacy into perspective. Yet, the Treaties seem to provide an answer: Art. 32 TEU, 
Art. 35 TEU and Art. 221 (2) TFEU13 all stress that EUDELs shall cooperate with member 
states’ diplomatic and consular missions, in line with the EU’s general principle of 
sincere cooperation between the Union and its member states.14 Yet, from a state-
centric perspective, diplomacy is regarded as “the dialogue between states” 
according to the definition of the former British diplomat Adam Watson.15 
Consequently, it could be argued that national diplomatic missions are still the 
prevailing diplomatic actors, and that they rather marginalize EUDELs instead of 
cooperating with them. In contrast, Hamilton and Langhorne consider that the state 
becomes increasingly irrelevant as a diplomatic actor.16 They would presumably 
argue that EUDELs will develop as the new dominant European diplomatic actors, who 
could even replace member states’ diplomatic missions in the long term, even though 
this was not intended by the Treaties.  
Thus, this paper examines to what extent the EUDEL has emerged as a 
diplomatic actor that centralizes, complements or competes with the diplomatic 
activities of member states’ permanent missions to the African Union. I argue that the 
                                                 
9 Ibid., Art. 221 (2) TFEU. 
10 Ibid., Art. 27 (3) TEU. 
11 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2010/427/EU) of 26 July 2010 establishing 
the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 201/33, 26 July 2010, Brussels, p. 5.  
12 The notion of ‘diplomatic mission’ is used in this paper as the umbrella term for ‘permanent 
missions’ and ‘embassies’. However, these last two concepts differ from each other, because 
‘permanent missions’ are attached to international and regional organisations, whereas 
embassies maintain bilateral relations with other states according to K.S. Rana, “Embassies, 
Permanent Missions and Special Missions”, in C.M. Constantinou, P. Kerr and P. Sharp (eds.), The 
SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, London, Sage, 2016, p. 154. 
13 European Union, “Consolidated Versions”, op. cit., Art. 32 TEU, Art. 35 TEU, Art. 221 (2) TFEU.  
14 Ibid., Art. 4 TEU. 
15 A. Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States, London, Routledge, 1991 (1982), 
quoted in G.A. Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010, p. 5.  
16 K. Hamilton and R. Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and 
Administration, London, Routledge, 2010, 2nd edn., p. 229.  
EU Diplomacy Paper 13/2017 
6 
EU and its member states have developed an ‘umbrella regional diplomacy’17 
regarding the AU. This means that the EUDEL is covering all policy areas that have 
been defined for AU-EU relations, whereas the EU member states are free to 
complement its approach bilaterally. However, this main argument needs to be 
nuanced by two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, there is a tendency 
towards more centralization at the level of the EUDEL, because the AU grants a more 
privileged access to AU meetings to the EUDEL than to most of the EU member states’ 
permanent missions. Moreover, the EUDEL is capable to attend all these meetings 
because it has the necessary resources. This makes the EUDEL the central hub of 
information gathering on which especially smaller EU member states rely. Furthermore, 
the EUDEL is the core when it comes to issuing public statements on AU-EU relations. 
On the other hand, the bigger member states like France, Germany and the UK have 
the capacities to pursue extensively their bilateral relations with the AU. Especially in 
informal meetings with the AU, it is difficult to assess whether they act complementarily 
to the EUDEL or whether they try to extend their bilateral relations in competition to the 
EUDEL’s relations with the AU. In the context of Brexit, the UK could attempt to become 
an even more competitive diplomatic actor.  
The paper adds new insights to the research on EU diplomatic relations since 
the focus of research so far has mostly been on the EU’s representation to third 
countries18 or to international organizations like the United Nations (UN)19 – where EU 
member states are members themselves, unlike in the case of the AU.  
The next section sets out the broader context of AU-EU relations. It is followed by 
the conceptual framework which draws on Pigman’s concepts of representation and 
communication20 and a methodological approach that is based on both quantitative 
and qualitative indicators. The remainder of the paper will then present the findings 
before conclusions are drawn. 
 
  
                                                 
17 This wording is also used in D. Spence, “Taking Stock 50 Years of European Diplomacy”, The 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 242.  
18 See e.g. F. Austermann, European Union Delegations in EU Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic 
Service of Different Speeds, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
19 See e.g. K.V. Laatikainen, “The EU Delegation in New York: A Debut of High Political Drama”, 
in D. Spence and J. Bàtora (eds.), The European External Action Service European Diplomacy 
Post-Westphalia, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 195-218.  
20 G.A. Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011, pp. 5-7.  
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The EU Delegation to the African Union as an important diplomatic hub  
 
The Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its first action plan were adopted on the occasion of 
the second Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007.21 The joint strategy is meant to be the 
overarching long-term framework to structure the relations between Africa and the 
EU.22 It aims at putting Africa-EU relations on an equal footing by reinforcing a strong 
continent-to-continent partnership, a common approach to promote peace, 
democratic governance, development policies as well as effective multilateralism 
and a people-centred approach.23 The JAES further states that these long-term 
principles and objectives should be implemented in four strategic areas, namely 
“peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and regional integration 
and further key development aspects (like the achievement of the MDGs [Millennium 
Development Goals] at that time)”.24  
 To implement the cooperation between the AU and the EU, the JAES provides 
a complex institutional setting. At the core are the triennial Africa-EU Summits of the 
Heads of States and Governments.25 While member states’ involvement in the Africa-
EU relations is present, for instance throughout the Africa-EU Summits or during the EU 
Political and Security Committee-African Union Peace and Security Council (EU PSC-
AU PSC) meetings, the AU member states are in general less engaged in the Africa-EU 
Partnership and, therefore, delegate the main responsibility to the AU Commission.26 
In comparison, EU member states are more engaged in the partnership, especially in 
the Council’s Working Group for Africa (COAFR).27 However, this is a distinctive process 
that should not be confused with the subsequent diplomatic representation and 
communication of European policies in third parties’ capitals. Hence, this paper does 
not analyse the role of EU member states in Brussels regarding EU policy formulation, 
but addresses exclusively the question of diplomatic relations of the EU and its member 
states towards the AU.  
 Despite the wide range of actors involved in AU-EU relations, the JAES points out 
that the EUDEL remains indispensable for AU-EU relations to ensure effective interaction 
                                                 
21 J. Mangala, “Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: Historical Background, Institutional Architecture, 
and Theoretical Frameworks”, in J. Mangala (ed.), Africa and the European Union: A Strategic 
Partnership, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 20.  
22 Council of the European Union, “The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership”, op. cit., p. 2.  
23 Ibid., pp. 2-3.  
24 Ibid., pp. 4-12.  
25 Ibid., p. 20.  
26 Mangala, op. cit., p. 33. 
27 Ibid., p. 32.  
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between both organizations.28 The first action plan further stated that the EUDEL should 
represent the EU “in all areas of competency and activity”.29 The second action plan 
added that the EUDEL is essential “in ensuring effective EU coordination […] among 
member states”.30 Lastly, Jack Mangala concludes that the EUDEL to the AU provides 
added-value to the implementation and the monitoring of the JAES.31 Hence, in the 
sense of Art. 221 TFEU, the main role of the EUDEL to the AU is to be the permanent EU 
representative in Addis Ababa that is tasked with the daily implementation of the JAES 
and in so doing coordinates with EU member states’ permanent missions.   
 
Framework of analysis: Conceptualizing the ‘Essence of Diplomacy’ 
 
In their comprehensive study on the “Essence of Diplomacy”, Jönsson and Hall identify 
representation and communication as the two core functions of diplomacy.32 As 
Pigman further notes, “[b]y thinking of the study of diplomacy as the study of 
representation and communication between global actors […], we set ourselves a 
general roadmap of terrain to be covered”.33 Thus, it seems to be particularly workable 
to approach diplomacy from the perspective of both core functions. There seems to 
be a common understanding among scholars that representation and 
communication are the two main activities of diplomacy. This is also illustrated by 
Pigman’s work “Contemporary Diplomacy”,34 which is based on both functions and 
whose definitions outline the conceptual framework of this paper. Regarding the 
function of representation, Pigman notes that “[r]epresentation begins with the notion 
of the diplomatic actor itself, but asks how the actor represents itself to others with 
whom it wishes to establish and maintain a relationship or dialogue”.35 Hence, the 
notion of representation is crucial in the context of this work, because it touches upon 
the question of who is representing the EU and its member states at the AU. However, 
an additional component is indispensable, namely communication. In this regard, 
Pigman explains that “[t]he idea of communication as a core diplomatic function 
                                                 
28 Council of the European Union, “The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership”, op. cit., p. 20.  
29 Council of the European Union, First Action Plan (2008-2010) For the Implementation of the 
Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, Lisbon, December 2007, p. 28.  
30 Council of the European Union, JAES Action Plan 2011-13: Cross-cutting issues, Tripoli, 
November 2010, p. 10.  
31 Mangala, op. cit., p. 33. 
32 C. Jönsson and M. Hall, Essence of Diplomacy, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
33 Pigman, op.cit., p. 10. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 5.  
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begins with this original understanding of diplomacy as the art of negotiation, but it 
recognizes that diplomacy comprises a much broader range of communications than 
those that would strictly be considered negotiations”.36 Thus, communication can be 
understood as a rather loose concept that embraces all different forms of exchange 
between diplomatic representatives. Regarding the differentiation between 
representation and communication, Pigman states that “communication, is distinct, 
although inseparable, from representation”.37 Thus, I interpret this distinction in the 
case of the EU and its member states at the AU as follows: representation refers 
concretely to the patterns that organize the external representation of EU member 
states’ permanent missions and of the EUDEL to the AU. Communication then analyses 
how, via which channels of interaction, this representation is taking place. While 
representation and communication can be separated in theory, they are both so 
strongly intertwined in practice that it would not make sense to analyse them strictly 
as two distinct components in the empirical study. 
Pigman’s definitions of representation and communication are a useful starting 
point to conceptualize the empirical findings, but they remain two vast concepts that 
need therefore to be operationalized by a concrete methodological framework.38 
Thus, to assess the interplay between the EUDEL to the AU and the member states’ 
permanent missions, the paper analyses to what extent EU and EU member states’ 
diplomatic relations with the AU are centralized, complementary or competitive. 
According to Austermann, who studied the EU’s diplomatic representation in 162 third 
countries, centralization “refers to the formally assigned and informally obtained 
channelling of diplomatic activity in EU matters through […] the Union Delegations, in 
the capital cities of non-EU countries”.39 Thus, centralization means that the EUDEL is 
the main channel of EU and EU member states’ diplomatic activities towards the AU. 
From this level of measurement, I derive two further definitions. Complementarity 
means, in my understanding, that the EU’s and the EU member states’ diplomatic 
activities are coordinated. Thus, the EUDEL and EU member states’ permanent missions 
to the AU are representing their entities and communicate with the AU in a coherent 
manner, but the EUDEL is not the sole channel of diplomatic activity anymore. 
Competition as the opposite of centralization indicates that EU member states try to 
                                                 
36 Ibid., p. 7.  
37 Ibid., p. 6.  
38 E. Reussner, The Rise of an Emerging Diplomatic Actor? Assessing the Role of the EU 
Delegation to the African Union, Master's thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2017, pp. 27-33.  
39 Austermann, op. cit., p. 37.  
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distinguish their diplomatic relations with the AU from the EU’s relations with the AU, by 
pursuing bilateral diplomatic activities that contradict the overall EU approach. In this 
case, EU member states try to avoid that diplomatic activities are mainly channelled 
throughout the EUDEL, instead they seek to keep them under their proper control.  
 According to these three levels of measurement, I will first conduct a 
quantitative study. I base this study on Austermann’s comprehensive research design, 
which she calls the “EU Diplomacy Centralization Index” (EU-DCI).40 She considers this 
index as “a tool to measure the impact of EU diplomacy in the world in a 
comprehensive and comparative fashion”.41 While her analytical framework is rather 
broad and focuses on centralization of European diplomacy in third countries and not 
at international organizations, it also incorporates two aspects measured by four 
indicators that can be applied to international organizations. A first aspect that is 
relevant for my empirical research is the “[i]nternal coordination of EU policy among 
EU Delegations and member state embassies via EU Delegations”.42 The second 
aspect refers to the “[u]nified external representation of the EU towards third countries 
via the EU Delegations”.43  
As set out in Tables 1 to 4 below, four indicators are used and adequately 
adapted for the purpose of this paper in form of a point system. The more points, the 
more centralized the Union’s diplomacy. 
 
Table 1: First indicator – The number of EU member states’ diplomatic missions 
Source: Author’s compilation based on F. Austermann’s EU-DCI.44 
 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 98.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 99.  
44 Ibid., p. 105.  
Number of EU member states’  
diplomatic missions Number of points awarded 
0 3 
1-5 2,5 
6-10 2 
11-15 1,5 
16-20 1 
21-26 0,5 
27-28 0 
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Thus, it is expected that the lower the number of EU member states’ diplomatic missions 
in a given country, the higher the centralization of EU diplomacy, because 
coordination is more effective and the EUDEL plays a more important role.45  
 
Table 2: Second indicator – The number of EU staff per EUDEL 
Number of EU staff per EUDEL 
 
Number of points awarded 
12+ 3 
9-12 2 
5-8 1 
0-4 0 
Source: Author’s compilation based on F. Austermann’s EU-DCI.46  
 
Hence, the more personnel an EUDEL possesses, the more it is expected to have the 
capacities to centralize EU diplomacy.47  
 
Table 3: Third indicator – Seniority of the Head of Delegation (HoD) 
Seniority of the Head of Delegation according to 
the administrator function group (AD) Number of points awarded 
AD level of 15 or 16 2 
AD level of 12, 13 or 14 1 
AD level of 11 or less 0 
Source: Author’s compilation based on F. Austermann’s EU-DCI.48 
 
The seniority of the Head of Delegation is analysed according to his/her administrator 
function group. In total, there are twelve different levels from five to sixteen, whereas 
the latter represents the most senior level. Austermann argues that the higher the 
seniority of the HoD, the more he/she is capable of coordinating between the EUDEL 
and the EU member states’ diplomatic missions.49  
 
Table 4: Fourth indicator – Professional career of the Head of Delegation 
Professional career of the Head of Delegation Number of points awarded 
EU official 1 
EU member state diplomat 0 
Source: Author’s compilation based on F. Austermann’s EU-DCI.50  
 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 101. 
46 Ibid., p. 105.  
47 Ibid., p. 102. 
48 Ibid., p. 105.  
49 Ibid., p. 103.  
50 Ibid., p. 105.  
EU Diplomacy Paper 13/2017 
12 
Austermann argues, that a HoD who is an EU official is more effective in centralizing 
European diplomacy than a HoD who is a national diplomat, because the former acts 
more in line with unified Union interests.51  
 This quantitative study is a first useful approach to analyse the degree of 
centralization regarding the EU’s and EU member states’ diplomatic relations with the 
AU. However, I enhance and complement it with a qualitative study for the following 
three reasons: First, even though the rationale behind Austermann’s indicators is 
justified by the outcome of a substantive number of case studies, her indicators 
remain, nevertheless, hypothetical. For example, it is not definite that a potential high 
number of EU member states’ permanent missions to the AU leads automatically to 
less effective coordination. Thus, the qualitative study is necessary to verify the 
quantitative outcomes. Second, Austermann’s study focuses largely on internal 
coordination patterns, which are the basic requirement for a unified external 
representation. However, she differentiates less between the different actual forms of 
external representation, and thus of communication, that exist regarding a third party. 
Third, she measures the degree of centralization, but her research design does not 
assess the nature of European diplomacy in case centralization is rather weak. Hence, 
it cannot assess whether European diplomacy would still be complementary or 
competitive. Therefore, a qualitative study needs to complement the analysis. 
Consequently, I add three qualitative aspects to the methodological framework.  
The first aspect of the qualitative study is the question who is the main 
diplomatic interlocutor to the AU. The more the activity of the interlocutor is channelled 
through the EUDEL, the more European diplomacy seems to be centralized. 
Furthermore, the qualitative approach can assess the complementary or competitive 
nature, in case the interlocutor activity is not only channelled through the EUDEL. I 
understand the concept of diplomatic interlocutor to the AU, first of all, as the formal 
representative of the Union and of the EU member states to the AU. Since the EU and 
the EU member states have an observer status, they can both be invited by the AU.52 
This role draws upon what the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)53 
considers the core activity of diplomatic missions, namely representation to a third 
                                                 
51 Ibid., p. 103.  
52 Interview with official, German Embassy in Addis Ababa (per telephone), 5 April 2017.  
53 Done at Vienna on 18 April 1961, it is the most significant Convention for regulating diplomatic 
relations amongst states until today, according to J. Wouters and S. Duquet, “The EU and 
International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 7, no. 1, 
2012, p. 32. 
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party.54 Thus, I operationalize this activity in a narrow sense to assess the EU’s and the 
EU member states’ representation in formal AU meetings. On the contrary, the second 
role of the diplomatic interlocutor to the AU builds upon the VCDR’s core activity of 
‘negotiation’ with a third party.55 To be more comprehensive, I enhance the meaning 
of ‘negotiation’, in the sense of Pigman, to the broader scope of diplomatic 
communication,56 which involves to my understanding any form of dialogue between 
representatives of the EU and its EU member states on the one hand and 
representatives of the AU on the other hand. Thus, I operationalize the second and 
rather broad aspect of the diplomatic interlocutor to assess the activities of the EUDEL 
and the EU member states’ permanent missions in informal meetings with the AU. Even 
though the VCDR concerns legally speaking only states, I apply nevertheless both 
functions to the EUDEL, given that the VCDR defines them as essential activities of 
diplomatic missions, and because Wouters and Duquet confirm that the EU tries to 
respect the VCDR to the “widest extent possible”.57 Moreover, the focus on formal and 
informal meetings allows for a more differentiated analysis of the diplomatic 
interlocutor’s role.  
The assessment of the diplomatic interlocutor leads to a second important 
dimension that needs to be analysed in the qualitative study: the gathering and 
sharing of information.58 On the one hand, this implies identifying who gathers most of 
the information from the AU: the EUDEL or the EU member states’ permanent missions. 
On the other hand, it questions how the gathered information is shared among the 
EUDEL and the EU member states’ permanent missions. It is a valid indicator for the 
degree of centralization because the more the gathering and sharing of information 
happens via the EUDEL, the more likely is a high degree of centralization of European 
diplomacy. Furthermore, this aspect can be used to control the findings of the 
quantitative study since the sharing of information is a prerequisite for effective 
coordination. Thus, the degree of coordination can be verified by the degree of 
information sharing. Lastly, this dimension is chosen because van Schaik and Drieskens 
note that “the question is not only whether the EU member states will be willing to share 
sensitive and confidential information […] but also whether they want to be 
                                                 
54 United Nations, “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations“, Vienna, 18 April 1961 and 
entered into force 24 April 1964, Art. 3(1)(a), in United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, 2005.  
55 Ibid., Art. 3(1)(c).  
56 Pigman, op. cit., p. 7.  
57 Wouters and Duquet, op. cit., p. 32.  
58 The aspect of information gathering also relates to the third VCDR core activity of diplomatic 
missions that can be found in United Nations, “Vienna Convention”, op. cit., Art. 3(1)(d).  
EU Diplomacy Paper 13/2017 
14 
dependent upon information that is gathered and organized centrally”.59 In other 
words, a highly centralized degree of information gathering and sharing makes EU 
member states and the EUDEL more dependent on each other and thus fosters the 
centralization of European diplomacy.  
While the aforementioned aspects present more classical elements of 
diplomacy, the third qualitative dimension touches upon the evolution of diplomacy, 
in particular the use of new technologies and the growing importance of public 
diplomacy. Nicolas Cull defines public diplomacy as “the process by which 
international actors seek to accomplish the goals of their foreign policy by engaging 
with foreign publics”.60 Cull identifies advocacy as an important feature of public 
diplomacy. In his understanding, advocacy is a diplomatic actor’s attempt to steer its 
policy ideas and interests in a third country by means of communication activities.61 
Here, advocacy is used as a qualitative indicator for public diplomacy. The most 
accessible way to measure advocacy is by counting the public statements issued by 
the EUDEL and by the EU member states’ permanent missions regarding their relations 
with the AU. The more public statements are issued by the EUDEL, instead of the EU 
member states’ permanent missions, the more it can be assumed that this diplomatic 
activity is channelled through and thus centralized by the EUDEL. In case public 
statements are also channelled through EU member states’ permanent missions, the 
complementary or competitive nature of the published statements can be further 
assessed.  
I analysed the websites of the EUDEL to the AU and of the EU member states’ 
permanent missions to the AU between March and Mai 2017 and conducted ten semi-
structured interviews with officials from the European Commission, from the EEAS (both 
at the headquarter in Brussels and per telephone with the EUDEL to the AU in Addis 
Ababa), with diplomats from EU member states (in headquarters and per telephone 
with the EU member states’ permanent missions in Addis Ababa) and with one official 
from the AU in Addis Ababa per telephone.  
 
  
                                                 
59 E. Drieskens and L. van Schaik, The European External Action Service: Preparing for Success,  
Clingendael Papers, no. 1, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, December 2010, p. 12.   
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A centralized European diplomacy vis-à-vis the AU? Findings of the case study 
 
This section demonstrates the extent to which European diplomacy is centralized vis-
à-vis the African Union. Therefore, it highlights the quantitative findings that are 
subsequently completed by the qualitative perspective.  
 
The quantitative perspective  
 
The quantitative analysis comes to a two-fold conclusion regarding the degree of 
centralization of European diplomacy towards the AU. On the one hand, the EUDEL 
seems to be sufficiently equipped and, thanks to the experience of the Heads of 
Delegation, capable to coordinate effectively with the EU member states’ permanent 
mission to ensure a unified external representation. On the other hand, the vast 
presence of EU member states’ permanent missions in Addis Ababa could hinder 
effective coordination. 
Concretely, there are 21 permanent missions of EU member states in Addis 
Ababa.62 Their high number highlights the importance of the AU for EU member states. 
Thus, the case study scores only 0,5 points according to Austermann’s first indicator of 
the EU-DCI. Consequently, this could indicate a low degree of centralization.   
However, the second indicator that measures the EUDEL staff nuances this first 
result. According to the EUDEL website, the number of personnel in the EUDEL is 35 with 
approximately 20 staff members in the political and development cooperation 
sections.63 This exceeds largely the minimum requirement for attributing the maximum 
amount of 3 points, given that the second indicator only requires an EUDEL to have at 
least 12 EU officials. Thus, the EUDEL is well-equipped with enough human resources to 
implement the different fields defined by the JAES and its action plans, which are 
crucial to ensure the functioning of AU-EU relations on a permanent basis. Furthermore, 
according to the underlying assumption of the second indicator, the EUDEL has 
enough staff to potentially be an effective coordinator between EU member states’ 
permanent missions.  
The third and fourth indicator address the role of the HoD who is equally 
important to ensure effective coordination and unified external representation. 
Regarding the HoD’s administrative level of seniority, an interviewed EEAS official 
stated that both, the current ambassador Ranieri Sabatucci as well as his predecessor 
Gary Quince have the level AD 14 as well as the status of a Director, which is the 
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second highest one after the General-Director.64 In Africa, the AD 14 level combined 
with the status of Director is the highest possible position for a HoD, which underlines 
the importance of the Head of the Delegation to the AU.65 Thus, even though the third 
indicator only grants 1 point to the HoD, it stresses the seniority of the EUDEL 
ambassador, which is why the latter is expected to be respected and recognized by 
the ambassadors of the EU member states.  
The last indicator examines the professional origins of the HoD. In this regard, the 
current and the previous HoD are both EU officials.66 These HoDs to the AU are 
therefore expected to pursue the Union interests, which is an important prerequisite for 
an effective coordination and which is why 1 point is awarded to the last aspect of 
the quantitative analysis.  
To sum up, the EUDEL to the AU scores 5,5 out of 9 points on Austermann’s EU-
DCI. This result illustrates a tendency towards a rather high degree of centralized 
European diplomacy. Yet, it also questions the pattern of coordinated and unified 
representation to some extent. The following qualitative study should contribute to 
clarifying the remaining ambiguities.   
 
The qualitative perspective  
 
This perspective presents the findings of the three qualitative aspects that were 
outlined in the conceptual framework: an analysis of the main diplomatic interlocutor 
to the AU, followed by the empirical results of the gathering and sharing of information, 
and finally public statements as a means to assess the centralization of advocacy. 
The main diplomatic interlocutor to the AU 
The EUDEL represents a significant channel of diplomatic activities to the AU, but EU 
member states are free to complement its role, especially in informal meetings. This 
pattern illustrates a trend towards an ‘umbrella regional diplomacy’ approach. 
However, Brexit could have a negative impact on this complementary umbrella 
approach, in case the UK is tempted to pursue its bilateral diplomatic relations with 
the AU more competitively, while still being a member state of the EU.  
                                                 
64 Interview with official 1, EU Delegation to the AU, European External Action Service, Brussels, 
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65 Ibid.  
66 European External Action Service, Press Release: High Representative Federica Mogherini 
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 In formal meetings, the role of the interlocutor is more densely channelled 
through the EUDEL than in informal meetings. A German diplomat points out that 
compared to EU member states, the EUDEL benefits from a more privileged access to 
AU PSC meetings to issue official statements. This enables the EUDEL to be the main 
European actor that presents the Union’s and the EU member states’ position towards 
the AU.67 As the German diplomat notes, the observer status of the EU and its EU 
member states to the AU is rather weak in comparison to other international 
organizations, because it is up to the AU to decide whether and to whom they grant 
access to AU meetings.68 The diplomat concludes that the AU tends to select its 
invitees according to the budget that the latter spend in support of the AU. In the area 
of peace and security, the EU, through the African Peace Facility, is the principal donor 
that finances the African Peace and Security Architecture, which also explains the 
AU’s willingness to invite the EU to its open AU PSC meetings more often.69 A Danish 
diplomat confirms this observation and adds that even though the EU budget for the 
AU support is built on EU member states’ contributions, the AU does not differentiate 
among EU member states’ donations and perceives only a unified EU budget 
support.70 Hence, the AU’s perception of a unified EU can explain why it only grants 
preferential access to the EU, but not to the EU member states.  
 These findings have two relevant implications for the study of European 
diplomacy towards the AU. First, the degree of high centralization is not the result of 
the approach of the EUDEL and the EU member states’ permanent missions towards 
more centralization. Rather, they are obliged by the AU to accept the EUDEL as the 
central diplomatic interlocutor to ensure a minimum access to AU formal meetings. 
Second, it is interesting to note that the preferential access of the EU seems to be 
correlated with the budget that it allocates to the AU. Thus, there seems to be a direct 
link between important financial means and their potential to facilitate diplomatic 
access. Nevertheless, most of the interviewees think that this privileged access to the 
AU needs to be put into perspective because it is not guaranteed, and a lot of AU 
meetings are closed sessions, where neither the EU member states nor the EU are 
present.71 However, the German diplomat interviewed is more optimistic about the 
openness of the recently elected AU Commission because the new President of the 
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AU Commission, Moussa Faki, has already stressed the importance of the AU-EU 
Partnership.72 Yet, not all interviewees share this optimistic view regarding the future of 
AU-EU relations. One member state official is even uncertain whether the AU 
Commission wants to engage with the EUDEL as its main interlocutor, arguing that the 
future AU-EU relations will importantly depend on the initiatives taken by the newly 
elected AU Commission.73 This statement underlines the vital dynamism that can 
shape the role of the main diplomatic interlocutor to the AU. However, for the time 
being, this role continues to be embodied by the EUDEL. 
 Despite the high degree of centralization, there is also evidence that the 
activity of the diplomatic interlocutor in formal meetings is partly channelled through 
EU member states’ permanent missions. For example, the German official notes that 
France and the UK as permanent members of the UN Security Council are invited to 
AU PSC meetings, when UN missions in Africa are discussed.74 In such a case, France 
and the UK coordinate their position with the EUDEL.75 Furthermore, if there is a topic 
on the agenda of an AU PSC meeting which is particularly important for some EU 
member states, the Danish diplomat notes that the EUDEL and the interested EU 
member states’ permanent missions can both be invited by the AU.76 However, in this 
case the EUDEL representative would always be the first to present the EU’s statement, 
and the EU member states’ positions are at all times aligned to the EU’s statement and 
further complement it.77 This pattern explains how EU member states can pursue their 
bilateral diplomatic relations under the umbrella of AU-EU relations. The Danish 
diplomat even stresses that it is thanks to the EU’s diplomatic weight that smaller EU 
member states are occasionally granted access to AU meetings by the AU 
Commission, which they would not get via bilateral channels.78 This is an interesting 
observation because it shows that the EUDEL does not seek to impose itself as the main 
interlocutor, but actually supports the EU member states’ permanent missions to 
become equally engaged with the AU in a complementary manner to the EU.  
 While the EUDEL remains nevertheless the main diplomatic interlocutor in formal 
AU meetings, the findings are less evident in informal meetings, where the strict rules of 
formal invitations to AU meetings do not apply. Hence, the German diplomat 
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concludes that it depends on the permanent missions’ resources to increase its 
respective role as an interlocutor.79 A European Commission official confirms that the 
EUDEL’s comprehensive resources enable its staff to ensure a permanent and wide-
ranging informal presence in the AU.80 An EEAS official adds that the EUDEL’s activities 
in informal meetings range from political dialogues and the provision of expertise to 
the supervision of EU projects.81 This also illustrates the large intertwinement of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and development issues in practice, 
despite their distinct legal nature. While the EUDEL proves to have largely sufficient 
resources to ensure permanent interaction with AU representatives, the German 
diplomat notes that this is not always the case for the EU member states’ permanent 
missions.82 Germany, the UK and France are the only EU member states that have a 
separate department in their embassies that deals with the AU. In contrast, most of the 
small EU member states have their ambassadors accredited to Ethiopia and to the AU 
at the same time.83 Officials in their embassies have to deal simultaneously with 
bilateral issues regarding Ethiopia and multilateral ones with the AU.84 Despite these 
limited resources, the Danish official insists on the importance of Danish bilateral 
relations with the AU.85 However, these bilateral relations only focus on specific areas 
– in the case of Denmark these are democratization and governance – while the 
EUDEL covers the entire portfolio of AU-EU diplomatic relations. But in these specific 
areas, Denmark is free to take strong initiatives, which follow the broad EU Foreign 
Affairs Council guidelines.86 The Danish example underscores once again the umbrella 
approach that is taken by the EU and its member states. The EU member states can 
rely on the EUDEL that ensures the overall diplomatic relations with the AU. Therefore, 
EU member states can focus on specific areas of national interest with their limited 
resources. This development is well received by an EUDEL official who welcomes EU 
member states’ commitments to engage with the AU and who stresses the added-
value for the EUDEL. While the Danish example suggests complementarity between 
EUDEL and EU member states’ activities, other diplomats from smaller EU member 
                                                 
79 Interview with official, German Embassy in Addis Ababa, op. cit.  
80 Interview with official 3, DG DEVCO, European Commission, Brussels, 31 March 2017.  
81 Interview with official 2, European External Action Service, Brussels, 31 March 2017.  
82 Interview with official, German Embassy in Addis Ababa, op. cit. 
83 This highlights that the conceptual distinction between embassies and permanent missions is 
actually blurred in this case study. Nevertheless, the paper continues to use the notion of 
‘permanent missions’ for reasons of simplicity. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Interview with official, Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa, op. cit. 
86 Ibid.  
EU Diplomacy Paper 13/2017 
20 
states are more sceptical. In particular, they suspect the bigger EU member states to 
take advantage of the informal ad hoc meetings to pursue more assertively their own 
bilateral relations.87 However, due to the informality of these meetings, the analysis 
cannot assess to what extent this statement is valid.  
 Regarding the AU’s perception of EUDEL-EU member states’ cooperation, one 
AU official notes that since several years the engagement of the EUDEL and of the EU 
member states with the AU has been progressively coordinated and complementary 
to each other.88 Interestingly, he also argues that, while the AU Commission and the 
European Commission used to have a lot of direct contact, the EUDEL has emerged 
as an increasingly important diplomatic intermediary.89 Thus, the EUDEL seems also to 
be perceived more and more by the AU as its main interlocutor in Addis Ababa. 
However, Brexit could qualify this current umbrella approach. As one official from the 
EUDEL mentioned, after the new AU Commission was elected, the British sought to 
organize a meeting with them prior to the EU. Eventually, the EU had the first meeting 
with the AU Commission, but the British attempt can nevertheless be interpreted as an 
emerging competitive behaviour regarding European diplomacy.90 However, this 
would also require the AU’s willingness to accept the UK’s increasing bilateral 
interlocutor role.  
The gathering and sharing of information 
Thanks to the EUDEL’s privileged access to official AU meetings and its capacities to 
attend a wide range of informal exchanges, it also has the most preferential access 
to information. This is why the interviewees underline that the EUDEL is the central hub 
for information gathering and sharing among the EU member states’ permanent 
missions.91 Especially smaller EU member states stress their reliance on the EUDEL’s 
information gathered from the AU, to stay informed about recent political 
developments, which the EU member states’ permanent missions could not collect 
themselves due to their limited resources.92 A Belgian official even concludes that it is 
the main purpose of the EUDEL to share the gathered information among the EU 
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member states.93 Considering that the EU and its EU member states have limited 
access to AU meetings, an EEAS official considers that the need for constant 
coordination among the EUDEL and EU member states’ permanent missions – like it 
would be the case for the UN in New York – is less urgent in Addis Ababa. The principal 
motivation of the EU and its EU member states to be present in Addis Ababa is to 
gather and to share a maximum amount of information about the AU.94 As Drieskens 
and van Schaik have previously argued, it is not always self-evident that EU member 
states are willing to rely on information gathered by the EU Delegation.95 In the case 
of the AU, this makes the EUDEL’s role as the central hub for information gathering and 
sharing even more relevant for European diplomacy.  
Nevertheless, information is also gathered and shared by EU member states’ 
permanent missions who benefit from a certain access to the AU. For example, a 
German diplomat highlights that thanks to the German development agency 
(Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), which is to a large extent 
involved in development projects with the AU, Germany gathers relevant information 
from the AU that it can share among its European colleagues.96 To this end, the 
German official stresses that there is a strong willingness of EU member states to 
exchange information.97 Thus, the EUDEL can also benefit from EU member states’ 
information, which could favour mutual dependency and consequently a higher 
degree of mutual trust. However, the suspicion of small EU member states vis-à-vis 
bigger EU member states pursuing their bilateral interest with the AU in informal 
meetings, could also indicate that some information is not shared afterwards. This 
could even apply to the EUDEL which might retain some information for its own 
interest.98 While this is a comprehensible argument that questions the trustworthy inter-
exchange of information, the overall empirical analysis suggests that it is not a general 
tendency and that the sharing of information remains overall dynamic and open, 
which is an important prerequisite for effective coordination. 
 How does this gathering and sharing of information then translate into effective 
coordination? An official from the EUDEL explains that once a month a coordination 
meeting at ambassador level takes place in the EUDEL and, additionally, there is one 
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meeting per month for the political counsellors and for the development counsellors.99 
A Danish diplomat adds that approximately once a week there are extra ad hoc 
meetings in the Delegation. Moreover, the Danish official states that there is no big 
difference between the degree of coordination in matters of CFSP and development 
issues, also because often the same EU member states officials deal with both areas.100 
The Belgian interviewee underlines that the EU member state who holds the Council 
presidency plays no role because all the official coordination meetings are chaired by 
and channelled through the EUDEL.101 So, official coordination seems to be an activity 
that is largely centralized by the EUDEL. According to a Finnish diplomat, this 
coordination is not only centralized, but also effective, especially regarding the local 
coordination of Union statements for formal AU PSC meetings.102 The diplomat explains 
that prior to AU PSC meetings, draft statements are circulated among all EU member 
states’ permanent missions, so that every EU member state can agree to a common 
position and, if deemed necessary, add a point of particular interest.103 Hence, while 
the Union is often the only invitee in AU PSC meetings, its statements reflect 
nevertheless the coordinated position of all EU member states, which underscores the 
centralization of its diplomatic activities. Moreover, this example embodies the 
umbrella approach taken by the EUDEL and the EU member states’ permanent 
missions. Thus, at first glance, the quantitative indicator that predicted a low level of 
coordination does not seem to be confirmed.  
 However, besides the official coordination process, the informal coordination 
dynamics need to be addressed as well. Considering the large number of informal ad 
hoc meetings between EU member states officials and AU representatives, a German 
diplomat concludes that this leads to a lot of exchange and coordination among EU 
member states officials outside the official EUDEL channels.104 Thus, the EUDEL does 
apparently not manage to centralize this informal coordination as well. This dispersed 
practice of coordination can bear the risk of overlapping activities. In case the 
informal coordination process does not include all EU member states, this could even 
result in contradicting actions. To this extent, the 0,5 points that European diplomacy 
scores regarding its numerous presence of EU member states’ permanent missions in 
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Addis Ababa can be partly confirmed at this point. However, EU member-state 
officials perceive in general this informal exchange as open and dynamic, despite 
some room for improvement.105 Therefore, they seem largely satisfied with the 
effectiveness of the current informal coordination process.106  
Public statements as a mean to measure the centralization of advocacy 
The results of this part are based on an extensive analysis of the EU member states’ 
permanent missions’ websites and the web presence of the EUDEL to the AU.107 The 
findings suggest that advocacy, as part of the broader field of public diplomacy and 
measured via public statements, is the most centralized dimension of European 
diplomacy. 
 The analysis shows that France and Germany are the only EU member states 
whose embassies’ websites include a section specifically dedicated to their respective 
bilateral relations with the AU.108 While the focus on bilateral relations helps both 
countries to raise their profile in public, they present themselves in the framework of 
the overall EU approach. For example, German public statements highlight mostly the 
cooperation between Germany and the AU in the area of peace and security, which 
is part of the JAES priorities.109 The German advocacy approach can thus be 
interpreted as an important commitment to AU relations. Apart from this, all other EU 
member states publish statements regarding their bilateral relations with Ethiopia.110 
Even Germany seems only to publish a small number of statements, namely seven 
between the end of 2015 and May 2017, which are complemented by five 
downloadable booklets about the cooperation between Germany and the AU.111 
Regarding the overall AU-EU relations, no EU member state has apparently published 
any statement on its respective website. Thus, it seems that the responsibility of 
advocacy is completely delegated to the EUDEL. The analysis of the EUDEL’s web 
presence confirms this conclusion. An extensive list of statements regarding AU-EU 
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relations can be found on the EUDEL’s website.112 Furthermore, the EUDEL posts on a 
daily basis statements on its twitter account113 and on its Facebook page.114 And the 
current ambassador Ranieri Sabatucci also has his own twitter account that he uses 
actively.115  
 The dense degree of channelling advocacy activities through the EUDEL is also 
confirmed by the interviewees. Due to limited resources, the Danish official states that 
public diplomacy is the first activity that the EU member states’ permanent missions in 
Addis Ababa cease to pursue. Therefore, he sees an important added value of the 
EUDEL in this field of diplomatic activities.116 Interestingly, and in contrast to political 
statements, both the Danish and the Finnish official cannot recall that they have ever 
coordinated public EU statements.117 This is partly because the EUDEL uses often 
previously coordinated political statements and transforms them into public 
statements.118 Nevertheless, the aspect of advocacy suggests that the EUDEL has not 
only centralized this activity, but gained a certain extent of autonomy vis-à-vis the EU 
member states as well. The trend to more centralization is not in opposition to EU 
member states’ interests, but illustrates how the EUDEL can add value to the EU 
member states’ limited resources. 
 
Conclusion: The birth of an umbrella regional diplomacy 
 
This paper has examined to what extent the EUDEL has emerged as a diplomatic actor 
that centralizes, complements or competes with the diplomatic activities of member 
states’ permanent missions to the African Union. The analysis of the paper’s research 
question provided relevant empirical findings confirming that the EU and its member 
states have developed an ‘umbrella regional diplomacy’ concerning the diplomatic 
relations with the AU. The EU ensures the overall diplomatic relations with the AU, which 
enables EU member states to focus on their bilateral relations with the AU within this 
framework in specific areas of interest to them and in alignment with the EU position. 
Hence, their interplay is to a large extent complementary. However, the empirical 
findings also show that the overall complementarity is nuanced, depending on the 
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diplomatic activity. Concerning the presence in official AU meetings, the gathering 
and sharing of information and the issuing of public statements, the EUDEL seems to 
channel diplomatic activities more intensely. This trend is importantly shaped by the 
AU’s choice of its respective diplomatic counterpart. This trend towards more 
centralization is also challenged by the bigger EU member states that have enough 
capacities to pursue their bilateral relations with the AU. Especially in informal meetings 
and exchanges, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these EU member states act 
complementarily. And Brexit could further push the UK to become a more competitive 
actor vis-à-vis its European colleagues. 
The empirical findings also allowed to assess the strengths and flaws of the 
paper’s theoretical framework. On the one hand, the use of the core functions of 
diplomacy as the conceptual framework for the case study was productive. 
Representation and communication allowed for a differentiated analysis that 
considered a wide range of facets of European diplomacy. On the other hand, both 
functions focus primarily on the diplomatic actor that seeks to represent itself – in this 
case the EU and its EU member states – but they tend to marginalize the importance 
of the counterpart that receives the diplomatic representatives. The empirical analysis 
has shown that the patterns of representation and communication among the EUDEL 
and the EU member states cannot be adequately explained, if the impact of the AU 
is not taken into account. 
 The ‘regional umbrella approach’ illustrates how the EU and its EU member 
states implement the Africa-EU Partnership in terms of diplomatic relations with the AU. 
In addition, further lessons can be drawn from this case study for other EUDELs to 
regional organizations, like the one to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). This EUDEL is based in Jakarta and has only recently opened in August 2015.119 
Thus, the practice of ‘umbrella regional diplomacy’ could be a workable approach 
for this EUDEL to strengthen its diplomatic ties to EU member states and to ASEAN at 
the same time. Moreover, the empirical study has shown that the analysis of the EUDEL 
and the EU member states’ permanent missions to the AU takes place in a dynamic 
environment. From the European perspective, Brexit is expected to remodel European 
diplomacy to some extent. From the African perspective, the newly elected AU 
Commission will shape AU-EU relations. Considering the even broader African-EU 
context, the need to negotiate a new arrangement that will replace the Cotonou 
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Agreement after 2020 is another decisive factor that will influence Africa-EU relations 
in general and AU-EU/EU member states’ diplomatic relations in particular. To this end, 
the 5th AU-EU Summit in November 2017 is an important step to set the priorities for the 
future of AU-EU relations, which will also impact the diplomatic interlocutors of both 
continents. Therefore, the relations between the EUDEL in Addis Ababa, its EU member 
states’ permanent missions and the African Union will remain a dynamic process in 
which the EUDEL is expected to further play the crucial role of an emerging diplomatic 
actor.  
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